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Abstract 
Migrants are among the groups most vulnerable to economic fluctuations. As predicted by the 
"welfare magnet" hypothesis, migrants can therefore be expected to—ceteris paribus—prefer 
countries with more generous welfare provisions to insure themselves against labor market 
risks. This paper analyzes the role of the welfare magnet hypothesis for migrants to the EU-15 
at the regional level. The empirical analysis based on a random parameters logit model shows 
that the regional location decisions of migrants are mostly governed by income opportunities, 
labor market conditions, ethnic networks and a common language. There is no strong evi-
dence for the welfare magnet hypothesis in the EU, but the empirical model shows that the 
design of the (income) tax system has a large and consistent effect on locational choice. 
1  Introduction 
Migrants are among the groups most vulnerable to economic fluctuations. Arai and Vile-
helmsson (2004) and Dustmann et al. (2010) show that the unemployment response to eco-
nomic shocks is larger for migrants than for natives, a result which persists even after control-
ling for individual characteristics and differences in skill levels between migrants and natives. 
Green and Winters (2010) and the OECD (2010) also find a more pronounced response of 
migrants' employment and unemployment levels to economic fluctuations. Although part of 
the difference in the response between migrants and natives can be explained by occupational 
choice and the industries migrants are employed in, migrants are also hit harder by economic 
fluctuations because of a higher proportion of temporary work contracts, shorter tenure on the 
job or because of selective layoffs (OECD, 2010). As predicted by the "welfare magnet" hy-
pothesis  (Borjas, 1999a), migrants  can  therefore be expected to—ceteris paribus—prefer 
countries with more generous welfare provisions to insure themselves against labor market 
risks.  –  2  – 
  
This paper analyses the role of the welfare and tax systems in the locational choice of approx-
imately 9 million migrants who migrated to the EU-15 in the 1998-2007 period to test for the 
welfare magnet hypothesis in the European Union. The empirical analysis is based on an ex-
tensive dataset from the 2007 European Labour Force Survey at the NUTS-2 level. The em-
pirical analysis builds upon the work by Geis et al. (2008), who analyzed the role of institu-
tional factors in determining migrants' country choice. 
This paper, however, extends the previous literature in several important aspects. First of all, 
almost all EU-15 countries are considered in the analysis instead of only a selection of coun-
tries (Geis et al, 2008, for example, consider only the choice between France, Germany, the 
UK and the U.S.). Secondly, the location decision is analyzed at the regional (NUTS-2), not 
the national level. As regions even within countries are often very heterogeneous with respect 
to income and labor market opportunities, this allows a better identification of the effect of la-
bor market and income variables. Finally, in contrast to previous studies the paper employs 
the more flexible random parameters logit (RPL) model which does not exhibit the indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property which is often violated in empirical applica-
tions of conditional or multinomial logit models. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides an overview of the 
empirical and theoretical literature on the location choice of migrants. Section 3 describes the 
data used and develops the empirical method applied in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
2  Overview of the literature on locational choice 
At the most basic level, differences in economic opportunities can be assumed to influence 
locational choice: individuals will move to countries or regions where they expect to earn a 
higher income (given differences in costs of living) and/or where they expect a higher proba-
bility of finding employment. Given these factors, individuals will furthermore—ceteris pari-
bus—prefer regions closer to their home country if costs of migration increase with distance. –  3  – 
  
2.1  Welfare magnets 
The location decision of migrants can also be explained by differences in welfare provision. 
As the so-called "welfare magnet" hypothesis predicts, generous welfare systems attract im-
migrants. This effect may not be limited to those with the highest labor market risks (such as 
low-skilled migrants, Borjas, 1999a), but also highly skilled migrants may prefer to live in a 
country with a more generous welfare system because migrants are generally among the 
groups most vulnerable to economic fluctuations and have a higher probability to lose their 
jobs in economic downturns, irrespective of their skill level (see, for example, Arai and Vile-
helmsson, 2004, or Dustmann et al., 2010). Generous welfare systems might even attract mi-
grants who would not have migrated otherwise or can keep migrants already living in gener-
ous welfare states from returning to their home countries (see Borjas, 1999a). Income-
maximizing migrants should thus be clustered in countries with more generous welfare sys-
tems. Countries or regions with more generous welfare systems might thus face a higher bur-
den in terms of social security expenditures. Furthermore, as shown by Lazear (1999), gov-
ernment transfers can reduce the incentives to assimilate, thus counteracting integration ef-
forts by governments. 
Most of the empirical literature on the welfare magnet hypothesis focuses on migration to or 
within the U.S., while there are only few studies for the EU or single European countries. 
Borjas (1999a) concludes that welfare-receiving immigrants in the U.S. show a higher degree 
of clustering. Levine and Zimmerman (1999), on the other hand, find no support for the wel-
fare magnet hypothesis in their analysis of moves within the U.S. In their analysis of migra-
tion flows to 22 OECD countries, Pedersen et al. (2008) find only weak results for their wel-
fare generosity proxy (public social expenditure as a percentage of GDP) which are even neg-
ative in some regressions. On the other hand, results by Åslund (2005) or Damm (2009) point 
to welfare seeking behavior by immigrants to Sweden and Denmark, respectively. However, 
because the generosity of the welfare system hardly varies within European countries, effects 
are hard to identify in single-country studies because of a low variation in the explanatory va-
riables.  –  4  – 
  
Geis et al. (2008) find mixed effects for their proxies for welfare generosity in their study 
covering France, Germany, the UK and the U.S. The authors estimate a negative effect of 
pension replacement rates on country choice, which can—according to the authors—be attri-
buted to a higher "implicit tax" associated with more generous pension systems. On the other 
hand, they find positive effects on migrants' choice of a host country for the quality of health 
care and educational systems as well as the unemployment replacement rate. 
2.2  Ethnic networks and herd migration 
Another factor which can significantly influence the locational choice of migrants is ethnic 
networks. Since a seminal study on migrant concentration in the U.S. by Bartel (1989), sever-
al hypotheses have been developed to explain the phenomenon that migrants tend to settle 
where other migrants from the same country of origin migrated before. One of the most fre-
quently cited theories is that ethnic clustering allows the formation of migrant networks which 
produce externalities for members of the same ethnic group so that the costs of migration de-
creases with the number of previous migrants (Massy et al., 1993, Carrington et al., 1996). 
Above reducing migration costs, networks can also provide help with the settlement process, 
decrease the perceived alienation in the host country (Bauer et al., 2000) or provide financial 
assistance (Munshi, 2003). Furthermore, networks can provide their members with ethnic 
goods or marriage markets (Chiswick and Miller, 2005). Migration networks can also have a 
positive effect on labor market prospects: new arrivals can benefit from a better availability of 
information and increased labor market opportunities (Gross and Schmitt, 2003, Edin et al, 
2001) or benefit from job referrals by more established members of the network which can 
not only increase the probability of finding employment, but can also help to channel network 
members into higher paying occupations (Munshi, 2003). If employers with migration back-
ground prefer to employ other migrants of similar ethnic origin instead of natives (Andersson 
and Wadensjö, 2007), a separate migrant labor market can emerge which can even sustain a 
higher wage than the larger "general" labor market (Gross and Schmitt, 2003). 
A  variety of empirical results  support  the network migration hypothesis.  Pedersen  et al. 
(2008) estimate the determinants for migration flows to 22 OECD countries and find a robust 
and sizeable effect of ethnic networks on the volume of migration flows. In a single-country –  5  – 
  
study focusing on Denmark, Damm (2009) showed that the relocation hazard of refugees ran-
domly assigned to a municipality during the Danish spatial dispersal policy is lower for those 
assigned to a municipality with a higher percentage of co-nationals. Åslund (2005) found sim-
ilar effects for immigrants to Sweden subject to the "Whole of Sweden Strategy". Geis et al. 
(2008) also found networks to have a positive (but decreasing) effect on locational choice. 
An alternative explanation for ethnic concentrations is herd behavior: if there is imperfect in-
formation and potential migrants observe only the outcome of previous migrants’ destination 
choices (but not the "signal" that determined their choice), they may discount their private in-
formation about alternative target regions and follow the flow of previous migrants (Epstein, 
2002, Bauer et al, 2005). 
2.3  Other factors affecting location choice 
Besides economic conditions, social security systems and ethnic networks, other factors can 
affect the location choice of migrants. Local characteristics, such as cultural institutions or 
climatic conditions—also called local "amenities"  which affect the individual's quality of 
life—constitute another factor determining the choice of target location. The explanatory 
power of amenities however depends on whether their value is capitalized in local wages and 
housing prices. But other interpretations are possible, as Krupka (2009) hypothesized in a re-
cent paper that individuals "invest" in appreciating the amenities of the region they were born 
in, and thus prefer target locations with amenities similar to those of the region they were 
born in. The author found broad support for his hypothesis in an empirical analysis using U.S. 
data. 
Another important aspect for international migration is income taxation, as it affects the net 
income available in the target country. Geis et al. (2008) find a negative effect of the income 
tax wedge on country choice. Country size also affects the distribution of migrants across 
countries and regions and it can be expected that larger regions are, all else equal, chosen –  6  – 
  
more often. Furthermore, Egger and Radulescu (2008) bring forward the argument that migra-
tion flows closely follow bilateral FDI flows, which favor large countries.
1
The probability of a migrant choosing a particular country can also be expected to be higher if 
the prospective host and home countries share the same language, which reduces the costs of 
staying in the host country considerably (Pedersen et al., 2008). Furthermore, knowledge of 
the host country's language can also raise the returns-to-skill in the host country (Grogger and 
Hanson, 2008). (Former) colonial ties between two countries can also affect the locational 
choice of migrants because of cultural similarities if the colonial power exported part of its 
culture (or legal code etc.) to the (former) colonies. 
 
Concerning the relative importance of the factors summarized in this section there is some 
evidence that the presence of other migrants from the same country is the primary factor driv-
ing the choice of a migrant's target location, while economic conditions are of lesser impor-
tance, as are welfare benefits (see, Zavodny, 1999, Pedersen et al., 2008). The relatively low 
importance of economic conditions can partly be explained by the fact that most migratory 
steps are not "speculative", but "contracted", i.e., individuals migrate only if they have a job 
offer abroad (Molho, 1986, Westerlund, 1997). Thus, it is likely more important to have fel-
low countrymen abroad which can provide information about job offers and help with finding 
a job before moving abroad than focusing on the general economic conditions. Nevertheless, 
the state of the economy does play a role because it influences the availability of job offers in 
general. 
The relatively low importance of welfare benefits found in the literature (compared to net-
work effects) can be attributed to the fact that in most countries migrants are not eligible for 
social security benefits right away and will have to spend some time in the receiving country's 
labor market before receiving the same welfare entitlements as natives. Nevertheless, the ge-
nerosity of the welfare system can play a role because a move to a region or country with a 
better social security system can be seen as an investment into future social security protec-
tion. 
                                                 
1 See Bergstrand et al. (2008) for a theoretical approach to linking FDI and migration flows. –  7  – 
  
3  Estimating locational choice 
3.1  Migration data 
The empirical analysis uses 2007 data from the European Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS). 
The EU-LFS is a regular questionnaire surveyed among a representative sample of house-
holds in all countries of the EU-27. Among other things, the data contain information on the 
region of residence (at the NUTS-2 level), the nationality and the country of birth for individ-
uals living in the EU. The country of birth is used to identify migrants and all individuals who 
were not born in the member state they reside in are considered "migrants". Because the data 
essentially constitute stock data, i.e., only those migrants are observed who have been living 
in the EU-15 in 2007, there is no information on repeat and return migration in the data. 
However, the data allows us to differentiate between those who moved during the last 10 
years and those who have been living in this region for more than 10 years. Because the EU-
LFS data do not contain information on the country of birth for Germany and Ireland, only 
158 NUTS-2 regions in 13 countries
2 of the EU-15 can be considered in the empirical appli-
cation. It is assumed that these 158 regions constitute the migrants' exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive choice set.
3
3.2  Estimation strategy 
 All in all, this paper models the location decision of 8,988,710 migrants 
from 166 different source countries who migrated to one of the 13 EU countries considered 
during the 1998-2007 period.  
Consider the locational choice of individual 𝑘𝑘 who intends to migrate to the EU-15. The indi-
vidual faces 𝑅𝑅 alternative regions, each with choice-specific attributes 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 (including the 
                                                 
2 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United King-
dom. Overseas territories, the exclaves Ceuta and Melilla and the relatively remote Canary Islands and the Azores and Madeira island re-
gions are not considered. Åland (Finland) as well as the Highlands and Islands and North Eastern Scotland regions in the U.K. must be ex-
cluded because of data restrictions. Because of data limitations Denmark is treated as a single NUTS-2 region and Serbia, Montenegro and 
the Kosovo must be considered a single source country. 
3 The choice of migrating vs. staying in the home country will not be modeled. Modeling this choice would imply including all source coun-
tries into the choice set as well as not only modeling the choice of all "stayers" but also the choices of all migrants from these source coun-
tries to all other countries outside the EU-15. Since this is practically infeasible, it is assumed that the individuals have already decided to 
migrate to the EU-15. Migration between the EU-15 countries is also not considered. Technically, for migrants within the EU-15 the regions 
of their home country would be included in their choice set, while they are actually not allowed to choose one of these regions (because only 
migrants are included in the empirical analysis). While it would in principle be possible to model the location decision of all EU nationals 
(including "stayers") with the data at hand, this is left to future research. –  8  – 
  
costs of migration). Using this information, she can compare her utility at different regions. 
The representative utility function is assumed to be linear in the characteristics of the regions: 
 
   𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 = 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝗽𝗽 + 𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘  (1) 
 
Individual 𝑘𝑘's utility of living in region 𝑘𝑘 thus depends on a vector of choice-specific charac-
teristics of this region, 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘, as well as a utility component 𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 which is unknown and treated 
as random. We can, however, not observe the utility of the different regions directly. Instead, 
we observe the information 𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘 = 𝑘𝑘 if the individual chose to migrate to region 𝑘𝑘, and we can 
assume that this region provides the individual with the highest utility (𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 > 𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 ∀ 𝑘𝑘 ∈ 𝑅𝑅 ≠
 𝑘𝑘). The final outcome can thus only be predicted in terms of probability. 
The probability of individual 𝑘𝑘 moving to region 𝑘𝑘 can be defined as Pr(𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘 = 𝑘𝑘) =Pr(𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 =
max[𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘1,𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘2,…,𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅]). Under the assumptions that the errors 𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 are i.i.d. extreme value, the 
probability  Pr(𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘 = 𝑘𝑘)  can then be estimated by the well-known  conditional logit model 
(McFadden, 1974):
4
  Pr(𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘 = 𝑘𝑘|𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘) =
exp�𝗽𝗽′𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘�
∑ exp �𝗽𝗽′𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘� 𝑅𝑅
𝑘𝑘=1
  (2) 
 
 
However, in the conditional logit model the relative odds of choosing one region over another 
should depend only on the characteristics of these two regions, while the relative odds should 
be independent of the availability or the characteristics of alternative regions, a property 
known as "independence from irrelevant alternatives" (IIA). While IIA has some advantages 
if satisfied (for example it allows the consistent estimation of parameters on a subset of 𝑅𝑅) its 
validity in empirical applications can often be questioned. 
Whether IIA holds can be tested by a Hausman test (Hausman and McFadden, 1984). This 
test is based on comparing the parameters of the unrestricted model (including all alterna-
                                                 
4 See also Bartel (1989), Bauer et al. (2000, 2002, 2005), Gottlieb and Joseph (2006), Jaeger (2007), Geis et al., 2008, or Christiadi and 
Cushing (2008) for related applications of the conditional logit model. –  9  – 
  
tives) to the parameters of a restricted model estimated on a subset of 𝑅𝑅. A significant test sta-
tistic provides evidence against IIA. Because the test does not offer guidelines for choosing 
the subset to exclude from 𝑅𝑅 and because of the vast number of alternative subsets to be ex-
cluded with 158 choice alternatives it is likely to find at least one restricted model where the 
parameters are significantly different from the unrestricted model. The IIA property is there-
fore likely to be violated. 
This calls for a model which does not exhibit the IIA property. Probably the most flexible 
model is the random parameters logit (RPL, also called mixed or random coefficients logit, 
see McFadden and Train, 2000, Hensher and Greene, 2003, Train, 2009, and the references 
contained therein for an overview).
5
The random parameters model can be derived from utility-maximizing behavior by assuming 
that the parameters of the characteristics 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 in the representative utility function are allowed 
to vary over individuals: 
 Although the random parameters logit framework goes 
back to the early 1980's (among the first applications are Boyd and Mellman, 1980, and Car-
dell and Dunbar, 1980) and recent advances in simulation techniques (foremost, the use of 
Halton draws, see below) and computing power have made its estimation more practicable, 
applications of the random parameters logit model are still scarce in migration research (one 
notable exception is the paper by Gottlieb and Joseph, 2006). 
  𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 = 𝗽𝗽𝑘𝑘
′  𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘   (3) 
 
In this utility function, 𝗽𝗽𝑘𝑘 is a vector of coefficients for individual 𝑘𝑘 representing 𝑘𝑘's prefe-
rences. The utility function is thus heterogeneous across individuals, and the coefficients' sign 
and size can differ between individuals according to a density 𝑓𝑓(𝗽𝗽|𝜃𝜃), where 𝜃𝜃 are the para-
meters describing the density of 𝗽𝗽. As in the conditional logit model, 𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 is assumed to be 
                                                 
5 A probably more common alternative model which relaxes the IIA assumption is the nested logit model. However, while nested logit does 
not impose IIA between nests, alternatives within nests are still assumed to exhibit independence of irrelevant alternatives. The model is thus 
less flexible than the RPL which can approximate any random utility model (McFadden and Train, 2000) and is therefore not considered 
here. –  10  – 
  
i.i.d. and follow an extreme value distribution. If the 𝗽𝗽𝑘𝑘's were known, the probability of 
choosing a specific region 𝑘𝑘 would, analogous to equation (2), be given by: 
 






   (4) 
 
However, because the 𝗽𝗽𝑘𝑘's are unobserved and we can therefore not condition on 𝗽𝗽, the prob-
ability of choosing a region 𝑘𝑘 is the integral of 𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘(𝗽𝗽𝑘𝑘) over all possible values of 𝗽𝗽𝑘𝑘 (Train, 
2009, p.138): 






�𝑓𝑓(𝗽𝗽|𝜃𝜃)𝑑𝑑𝗽𝗽   (5) 
 
The probability 𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 is thus the weighted average of the logit formula evaluated at different 
values for 𝗽𝗽, with the weights given by the mixing distribution 𝑓𝑓(𝗽𝗽|𝜃𝜃). The mixing distribu-
tion can be normal, lognormal, uniform, etc. If the parameters are assumed to be normally dis-
tributed, the estimated 𝜃𝜃 are the mean and standard deviation of a normal distribution which 
describe the distribution of the parameter in the population. Because the integral in (5) does 
not have a closed form solution, it must be approximated through simulation. The maximum 
simulated likelihood estimator is the value of 𝜃𝜃 that maximizes the simulated log likelihood 
(see Train, 2009, p. 144) and can be estimated in the STATA statistics package using the es-
timator by Hole (2007). 
While in earlier applications of the RPL model random draws were used for simulation, re-
cent applications have relied mostly on quasi-random Halton sequences (Halton, 1960). The 
main advantages of using draws from Halton sequences is that they provide a superior cover-
age of 𝑓𝑓(𝗽𝗽|𝜃𝜃) than random draws, and that they imply a negative correlation between the 
draws of different observations, which reduces the error in the simulated log-likelihood func-
tion (Train, 2009, p. 225). This feature makes simulation based on Halton draws more effec-
tive than simulation based on random draws, as shown for example by the comparisons in 
Bhat (2001), Train (1999) or Hensher (2001). Train (2009, p. 230) notes that "[…] a research-–  11  – 
  
er can expect to be closer to the expected values of the estimates using 100 Halton draws than 
1000 random draws", so that "[…] computer time can be reduced by a factor of ten by using 
Halton draws instead of random draws, without reducing, and in fact increasing, accuracy". 
3.3  Explanatory variables 
The choice of explanatory variables for the empirical analysis follows the discussion in sec-
tion 2 and other studies on the topic (see, e.g., Bartel, 1989, Davies et al., 2001, or Geis et al, 
2008). In addition to region specific variables, host country specific variables as well as coun-
try-pair specific variables are included in the regression, since some important determinants 
of locational choice (e.g., tax levels, etc.) do not between regions of the same country. Va-
riables specific to the source countries (such as unemployment or wage levels, or sending 
country fixed effects) cannot be considered in the conditional logit model, since variables 
with the same value for all 𝑅𝑅 choices cancel out in the logit formula (4). The same holds true 
for individual characteristics like age, gender or educational attainment.
6
3.3.1  Region specific variables 
 
Among the region specific 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘 attributes assumed to influence the probability of moving to a 
region is the area (measured in 1,000 km²): even if there is a completely uniform distribution 
of migrants across all regions, larger regions are likely to attract larger inflows of migrants. A 
similar argument can be made for the population (in 100,000): After controlling for region 
size (area), regions with a higher population share should also attract a higher share of mi-
grants. To control for differences in economic opportunities, the unemployment rate (in per-
cent) as well as the average annual income per employed person (in €1,000) are included in 
the regression. Data for population and unemployment (in 2006) as well as average annual in-
come per employee (in 2004) are taken from Eurostat. To proxy for the costs of migration (or 
the costs of visiting relatives at home), the distance (in 1,000 km, measured as the crow flies) 
between the capital of the migrants' home country and the largest city in the region of resi-
                                                 
6 It would, in principle, be possible to consider the effect of individual characteristics by including interactions of all model variables with 
individual level variables. However, because of technical and practical limitations on the number of random parameters which can be esti-
mated in the RPL model, the scope for including individual variables is rather limited and will be left to future research. –  12  – 
  
dence and its squared value are also included as is a dummy variable for those regions which 
comprise national capitals, since these can be expected to receive a ceteris paribus higher 
share of migrants because of being the cultural, political and administrative centers of the re-
spective countries. A negative effect of the unemployment rate and a positive effect of aver-
age annual income on the probability of choosing a specific region can be expected. For dis-
tance, a negative (but possible decreasing) effect can be expected. 
Another important regional specific variable is the local ethnic network (see section 2.1). To 
measure the influence of ethnic networks on the probability of migrating to a specific region 
the proportion of migrants born in the same country of origin who have been living in this re-
gion for at least 10 years in 2007 is included. For a migrant in ethnic group 𝑗𝑗, the network size 










10+ is the number of migrants of ethnic group 𝑗𝑗 who have been living in region 𝑘𝑘 for 
more than 10 years.
7
 
 Because the positive effect of the ethnic network can be expected to de-
crease with network size (see Heitmueller, 2006, Portnov, 1999, and Bauer et al., 2002), the 
squared network size will also enter the regression. Summary statistics for the explanatory va-
riables are shown in table 1. 
  [Table 1 about here] 
 
3.3.2  Country-pair specific variables 
Among the country-pair specific 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘 attributes is a dummy variable for linguistic closeness 
from CEPII which measures whether a migrant's home and host country share an official lan-
                                                 
7 Although, as shown by Nowotny (2010), the effect of ethnic networks is not limited to a region's boundaries, the spatially lagged ethnic 
network is not included in this regression.  –  13  – 
  
guage (1, zero otherwise). According to the CEPII data, 8.3% of all country pairs share a 
common official language, and a positive effect of this variable can be expected. Also in-
cluded is a neighborship dummy assuming the value 1 if the host and home countries share a 
common border, and zero otherwise. Again, a positive effect can be expected, e.g., because a 
common border facilitates not only legal, but also illegal immigration and can thus lead to ce-
teris paribus higher migrant stocks. As mentioned in section 2.4, colonial ties can also affect 
the locational choice of migrants. A dummy variable capturing whether two countries were in 
a colonial relationship after 1945 is included from the CEPII data (=1, zero otherwise). Ac-
cording to the data, a colonial relationship after 1945 can be found for 3.7% of all country 
pairs. 
3.3.3  Host country specific variables 
The host country specific 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘 variables are intended to capture the effects of the social security 
system on locational choice of migrants in order to test the welfare magnet hypothesis. The 
choice of variables used to proxy for the generosity of the social security system in this paper 
follows Geis et al. (2008). The first variable to be included is the net replacement rate during 
the initial phase of unemployment (following any waiting period) at the average wage for 
2007 from the OECD Benefits and Wages Statistics.
8
The sickness/health care expenditures per capita in Euro (2005 Eurostat data, ESSPROS do-
main) are included to proxy for the quality of the health care system. According to the data, 
 Although many migrants are not eligi-
ble for unemployment benefits right after arriving in the host country, a positive effect of the 
net replacement rate can be expected if migrants expect to become (temporarily) unemployed 
at some point in the future. The same holds true for the pension net replacement rate (for men, 
at average wage) published in OECD (2007). The unemployment and pension replacement 
rates differ widely across the EU countries considered, with levels ranging from 36% to 87% 
(unemployment benefits) and 41.1% to 110.1% (pensions), respectively. Austria's unemploy-
ment net replacement rate of 55% is slightly below average, while its pension replacement 
rate (90.9%) is markedly above average. 
                                                 
8 The value used in the regression is the replacement rate for single individuals without kids. –  14  – 
  
Austria's sickness/health care expenditures of about € 2,100 per capita and year are about av-
erage. As in Geis et al. (2008), the 2006 PISA science scores (OECD 2007a) are also included 
to control for the quality of the educational system. Among the countries considered, Austria 
has the 4
th highest PISA science score (511), excelled only by the U.K. (515), the Netherlands 
(525) and Finland (563). 
Because welfare provisions must be financed by taxes and social security contributions, va-
riables capturing the effects of the taxation system will be considered to control for the costs 
of living in a more generous welfare system. The average personal income tax and employee 
social security contribution rate (SSC) as a percentage of gross wage earnings measured at the 
average income is included from the OECD Tax Database (2007 figures). As it directly af-
fects the net income, a negative effect on location choice can be expected. Furthermore, the 
net income ratio will enter the regression as an explanatory variable to measure the progres-
sivity of the income tax system. Defining 𝑡𝑡(∙) as the function of the combined tax and SSC 
rates and 𝑦𝑦 � as average income, the net income ratio at 133% and 100% of the average wage is 
defined as (see Schratzenstaller and Wagener, 2009): 
 
NIR(1,1.33) =
1 − 𝑡𝑡(1.33𝑦𝑦 �)
1 − 𝑡𝑡(𝑦𝑦 �)
∗ 100 
 
where values NIR < 100 indicate a progressive income tax system, and progression is higher 
the lower the net income ratio. The progressivity of the income tax system can have either a 
negative or a positive effect on individual location decisions depending on whether the mi-
grant expects to earn a low income (in which case she can profit from the lower tax rate im-
plied by a higher progression) or whether the migrant expects to earn a high income. As table 
1 shows, the average combined tax and SSC rates evaluated at the average income range from 
20.5% (Spain) to 46.9% (Luxemburg) in the 13 EU countries considered according to the 
OECD data, with an average rate of 31.6%. The value for Austria is slightly above average 
(33.6%) and the 5
th highest value among all 13 EU countries considered in this paper. As the 
summary statistics for the net income ratios shows, all countries apply progressive income tax –  15  – 
  
schedules (at least in the 100% to 133% average income range). According to the net income 
ratio criterion, the countries with the lowest progressivity are Luxembourg, whose income tax 
code is not progressive between 100% and 133% of income (NIR = 100.0), and the U.K. 
(NIR = 98.5), while Denmark (NIR = 91.2) and Sweden (NIR = 91.7) are the most progres-
sive when comparing the net income rates at 100% and 133% of the average income. The 
Austrian net income rate is NIR = 94.4, the 5
th highest value among the 13 EU countries con-
sidered. 
Finally, data from the British Council's Migrant Integration Policy Index project (MIPEX II), 
which provides indices for the strictness of integration policies, also enters the regression. The 
included index measures the strictness of the laws governing labor market access and ranges 
from 0 to 100, with 0 representing  "critically unfavorable"  circumstances  and 100 
representing "best practice" (see Niessen et al., 2007).
9
4  Empirical analysis 
 The country with the highest value 
(and the only country to achieve a "best practice" rating of 100) is Sweden, the countries with 
the lowest ratings are Denmark and Greece (40 points), followed by Austria and Luxembourg 
(45 points). It can be hypothesized that a larger value of this index increases the attractiveness 
of a country as target location, so that a positive coefficient can be expected. 
The estimation of the RPL model follows Gottlieb (2006) in specifying both fixed as well as 
normally distributed parameters. A fixed parameter is essentially a coefficient whose standard 
deviation is zero (Hensher, 2003) and for which only a mean will be estimated. The only fixed 
coefficient to enter the model is the coefficient of area (in 1,000 km²): if migrants were evenly 
distributed across space, larger regions would have a—ceteris paribus—higher probability of 
being chosen by a single migrant, a probability which is independent individual tastes. All 
other coefficients are unrestricted and assumed to be normally distributed. The estimated pa-
rameters 𝜃𝜃 for these coefficients are thus the mean and standard deviation of a normal distri-
                                                 
9 The index covers the following dimensions: eligibility ("Are migrants excluded from taking some jobs?"), labor market integration meas-
ures ("What is the state doing to help migrants adjust to the demands of the labor market?"), security of employment ("Can migrants easily 
lose their work permit?") and rights associated ("What rights do migrants have as workers?"). –  16  – 
  
bution. This also allows us to calculate the area of the density function 𝑓𝑓(𝗽𝗽|𝜃𝜃) which is below 
and above zero. If part of the area of 𝑓𝑓(𝗽𝗽|𝜃𝜃) is below zero, a variable constitutes an attractor 
for some, and a repellent for other individuals. Although sign restrictions could be imposed by 
specifying some of the coefficients as being log-normally distributed the random parameters 
are specified as normally distributed to make the model as flexible as possible. 500 Halton 
draws are used for simulation in the random parameters logit.
10
Table 2 shows the results of the random parameters logit estimation. For unrestricted va-
riables the table shows the estimated mean and standard deviation of the random parameters 
(which define the normal distribution of these coefficient in the population). The fourth col-
umn gives the proportion of the estimated parameter's density which above zero (i.e., the per-
centage of the population for which the parameter is positive). The fifth column shows the 
exponentiated mean parameter of the random parameters logit, which can be interpreted as the 
odds ratio of an individual at the mean parameter. 
 
 
  [Table 2 about here] 
 
The results show that individuals prefer larger regions, both in terms of population as well as 
in terms of the area, although the latter coefficient is rather small. They also indicate that, as 
expected, a higher unemployment rate decreases while a higher income increases the proba-
bility of moving to a region. Interestingly, the effects are not positive for all individuals. Al-
though the parameter of the unemployment rate is negative for the majority of migrants and 
the vast majority of migrants ceteris paribus prefers regions with a higher average income, the 
parameter of the former is positive for about 16.4% while the parameter of the latter is nega-
tive for about 5.3% of all migrants. This does, however, not necessarily indicate that these in-
dividuals actually prefer regions with higher unemployment rates and/or lower income, but it 
                                                 
10 Halton sequences are usually defined in terms of a prime number. For the simulation of an integral of dimension 𝜄𝜄 (where the dimension is 
equal to the number of random parameters), the first 𝜄𝜄 prime numbers are conventionally used to generate 𝜄𝜄 Halton sequences (Cappellari and 
Jenkins, 2006). Because the initial elements of the sequences can be highly correlated across dimensions, Train (2009, p. 227) recommends 
to discard at least the first 𝜅𝜅 elements, where 𝜅𝜅 should be as least as large as the prime number used in the 𝜄𝜄'th dimension. Because the model 
has 18 random parameters (dimensions), the first 61 elements are dropped. –  17  – 
  
probably rather shows that the aggregate income and unemployment figures are not relevant 
for a segment of migrants to the EU-15. A higher score of the MIPEX II Labour Market 
Access Index increases the probability of moving to a region: countries with more liberal 
rules governing migrant's access to the labor market as well as to active labor market policies 
thus attract a—ceteris paribus—higher share of migrants. 
Ethnic networks increase the attractiveness of a region as target location for all migrants. At 
the mean estimated parameter, an increase in the ethnic network size of one percentage point 
almost doubles the odds of choosing this region. The effect of ethnic networks is, however, 
decreasing as indicated by the coefficient of the squared network variable. This suggests that 
ethnic networks can reach an optimal size beyond which the attractiveness of a region actually 
decreases (for example because of rising housing prices or a decrease in wages). The attrac-
tiveness of a region decreases with the distance to the source country which indicates that 
mobility costs do play a role in the location decision. The negative effect of distance is, how-
ever, decreasing as the distance between the capital of the source country and the largest city 
in the NUTS-2 region of residence rises. 
Unexpectedly, capital regions are a repellent for the majority of individuals and the parameter 
of the dummy variable is positive for only 25.4% of migrants. The common border dummy 
variable is positive for only 69.0% and only 28.4% prefer regions in countries of a former co-
lonizer. The effect of a common official language is, however, unequivocally positive and 
large for all individuals. The odds ratio of the common language dummy is 6.2 at the mean 
parameter, which indicates that the odds of moving to a region are more than six times higher 
if this region is in a country which shares an official language with the migrant's home coun-
try. 
Finally, turning to the variables capturing aspects of the tax and social security system the re-
gression shows that the attractiveness of a region decreases with the average combined tax 
and SSC rates as hypothesized. All else equal, a 1 percentage point increase in the average 
combined tax and social security contribution rates (at average income) decreases the mean 
odds of moving to a region by about 6.8%. Furthermore, the less progressive the income tax 
code, the more attractive a region, as shown by the positive coefficient for the net income ra-–  18  – 
  
tio. While the progressiveness of the income tax system is a repellent for almost all individu-
als, a higher average tax and SSC rate enters the utility function of 22.8% of the migrants with 
a positive sign. One explanation for this finding is that some individuals actually prefer coun-
tries with higher tax rates, if higher taxes also imply a higher level of public services. Fur-
thermore, the variable used here is the average tax and social security rate at the average in-
come. If the income tax system is progressive, individuals expecting to earn less than the av-
erage income will face a lower tax burden while they expect those with higher income to con-
tribute more to financing public services. 
Some results of the welfare system variables used to test the welfare magnet hypothesis in the 
EU-15 are rather unexpected. For example, the mean estimated parameter for the unemploy-
ment replacement rate is negative. In addition, the estimated standard deviation of the parame-
ter in the population is rather small so that 100% of the parameter's distribution is below zero. 
This indicates that the unemployment replacement rate actually has a negative effect on the 
probability of moving to a region. The same holds true for the  parameter of sick-
ness/healthcare expenditures per capita which was intended to measure the quality of the 
health care system. 
Finding negative effects for variables used to proxy for the provision of welfare services on 
locational choice is, however, not unprecedented in the literature (see Pedersen et al., 2008, or 
Geis et al., 2008). This might indicate that the variables used do not really reflect the generos-
ity of the welfare system, but other characteristics of the target country. For example, higher 
health care expenditures might indicate an ageing society, poor environmental conditions or a 
rather inefficient health care system. Another explanation is that (even after controlling for the 
average income tax and SSC rates) the general tax level (including indirect taxes) may be 
higher in more generous welfare states with higher expenditures and replacement rates, so that 
individuals can expect to bear a higher overall tax burden in these countries. If the individual's 
willingness to pay for an increase in welfare provision (the implicit increase in taxation they 
are willing to bear for an increase in the unemployment replacement rate or in healthcare ex-
penditures) is below the implicit tax price, the attractiveness of a region or country will be 
lower although it provides superior welfare (see also Geis et al., 2008). Furthermore, if mi-–  19  – 
  
grants are not eligible for social security benefits right away, the negative effect of the impli-
cit tax rates will be amplified in a more generous welfare system, because newcomers will 
have to pay higher taxes for welfare benefits they are not entitled to. These effects seem to 
dominate any positive effect based on expectations about future welfare benefits. 
The pension replacement rate on the other hand affects locational choice positively for all in-
dividuals. The same holds true for the PISA science scores, which are included in the regres-
sion to capture the quality of the educational system. Although the effects of these variables 
appear rather small (a one percentage point increase in the pension replacement rate increases 
the mean odds of moving to a region by only 0.5%, a one point increase in the PISA science 
score increases the odds by only 0.3%), the effects are quite sizable when considering the 
range of these variables (see table 1). The difference in the odds between regions in the coun-
try with the lowest science scores (Greece) and a region in the country with the highest 
science score (Finland) is more than 30%. For the pension replacement rate, this difference is 
more than 40%. As the estimated standard deviation of the parameter of the PISA science 
scores is not statistically different from zero, the coefficient can be seen as a fixed parameter 
which does not vary in the population. 
5  Conclusions 
This paper analyzed the role of the welfare magnet hypothesis for the locational choice of ap-
proximately 9 million migrants who migrated to 13 of the EU-15 countries in the 1998-2007 
period. The paper followed Geis et al. (2008) in the choice of variables capturing the generos-
ity of the welfare system. 
The empirical analysis based on a random parameters logit (RPL) model shows that the loca-
tion decisions of migrants in the 158 regions of the 13 EU countries considered are mostly 
governed by better income opportunities, more favorable labor market conditions (lower un-
employment), easier access to the labor market, higher ethnic networks, a lower distance to 
the home country as well as a common official language, while past colonial relationships ac-
tually decrease the probability of moving to a region for most migrants. –  20  – 
  
The regression, however, does not find strong evidence for the welfare magnet hypothesis—
the hypothesis that migrants are attracted to countries or regions with more generous welfare 
benefits. For example, the unemployment replacement rate (at average income) and the sick-
ness/healthcare expenditures (which are used to proxy for the quality of the health care sys-
tem) affect location choice negatively, contrary to the welfare magnet hypothesis. But the 
RPL model also shows results consistent with the welfare magnet hypothesis: the pension re-
placement rate (at average income) and the PISA science scores (to capture the quality of the 
educational system, cf. Geis et al., 2008) both enter the regression with positive coefficients. 
Generally, however, the regression provides no consistent evidence for the welfare magnet 
hypothesis, and the location decisions of migrants in the 13 EU countries considered are ra-
ther governed by income opportunities, labor market conditions (unemployment, low restric-
tions on access to labor market), networks and a common language. 
But the RPL shows that the design of the tax system significantly affects location decisions: 
migrants tend to settle in regions of countries with lower combined income tax and social se-
curity contribution (SSC) rates as well as a lower progressivity of the income tax system. 
However, as parameters are allowed to have different signs for different individuals in the 
RPL model, the average tax and SSC rates enter the utility functions of some migrants with a 
positive sign, and some individuals actually prefer regions in countries with a more progres-
sive income tax code. One explanation for this is that higher income tax and SSC rates also 
imply a higher level (or better quality) of public services, or that individuals expecting to earn 
less than the average income will face a lower tax burden in a progressive tax system while 
they expect those with a higher income to contribute more to the welfare system. Neverthe-
less, the design of the (income) tax system appears to have a larger and more consistent effect 
on locational choice than the design of the welfare system. 
Because it can be expected that some of these welfare and tax system variables have different 
effects on migrants with different skill levels, future extensions should focus on analyzing the 
skill-specific effects of these variables. For example, if low-skilled migrants face higher labor 
market risks, welfare variables should play a larger role in determining their location choice. –  21  – 
  
Literature 
Andersson, P., Wadensjö, E., The Employees of Native and Immigrant Self-Employed, IZA Discussion Paper No. 3147, Institute for the 
Study of Labor, Bonn, 2007. 
Anselin, L., Spatial Econometrics," in Palgrave Handbook of Econometrics, ed. by T. C. Mills, and K. Patterson, vol. 1, chap. 26, pp. 901–
969, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006. 
Arai, M., Vilehelmsson, R., Unemployment-risk differentials between immigrant and native workers in Sweden, Industrial Relations 34, 
2004, pp. 690-698. 
Åslund, O., Now and forever? Initial and subsequent location choices of immigrants, Regional Science and Urban Economics 35(2), 2005, 
pp. 141-165. 
Bandyopadhyay, S., Coughlin, C.C., Wall, H.J., Review of International Economics 16(1), 2008, pp. 199-213. 
Bartel, A.P., Where do the new U.S. immigrants live?, Journal of Labor Economics 7(4), 1989, pp. 371-391. 
Bauer, T., Epstein, G., Gang, I.N., What are Migration Networks?, IZA Discussion Paper No. 200, Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn, 
2000. 
Bauer, T., Epstein, G., Gang, I.N., Herd Effects of Migration Networks? The Location Choice of Mexican Immigrants in the U.S., IZA Dis-
cussion Paper No. 551, Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn, 2002.  
Bauer, T., Epstein, G., Gang, I.N., Enclaves, language and the location choice of migrants, Population Economics 18(4), 2005, pp. 649-662. 
Bergstrand, J., Egger, P., Larch, M., The new expats: economic determinants of bilateral expatriate, FDI and international trade flows, mi-
meo, University of Notre Dame, 2008. 
Bhat, C.R., Quasi-random maximum simulated likelihood estimation of the mixed multinomial logit model, Transportation Research B 35, 
2001, 677–693. 
Borjas, G.J., Self-selection and the earnings of immigrants, American Economic Review 77, 1987, pp. 531-553. 
Borjas, G.J., Immigration and Welfare Magnets, NBER Working Paper No. 6813, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, 1998. 
Borjas, G.J., The Economic Analysis of Immigration, in: Ashenfelter, O., Card, D. (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics 3A, North-Holland, 
1999. 
Borjas, G.J., Immigration and welfare magnets, Journal of Labor Economics 17(4), 1999a, pp. 607-637. 
Borjas, G.J., Brantsberg, B., Who leaves? The outmigration of the foreign-born, Review of Economics and Statistics 78, 1996, pp. 165-176. 
Boyd, J.H. and Mellman, R.E., The effect of fuel economy standards on the U.S. automotive market: An hedonic demand analysis," Trans-
portation Research A 14, 1980, pp. 367–378. 
Bratsberg, B., The incidence of non-return among foreign students in the United States, Economics of Education Review 14, 1995, pp. 373-
384. 
Brücker, H., Defoort, C., The (self-)selection of international migrants reconsidered: theory and empirical evidence, IZA Discussion Paper 
2052, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn, 2006. 
Burda, M.C., The determinants of East–West German migration: some first results, European Economic Review 37(2–3), 1993, pp. 452–461. 
Burda, M.C., Migration and the option value of waiting, Economic and Social Review 27(1), 1995, pp. 1–19. 
Cappellari, L., Jenkins, S.P., Calculation of multivariate normal probabilities by simulation, with applications to maximum simulated likelih-
ood estimation, The Stata Journal 6, 2006, pp. 156–189. 
Cardell, N.S., Dunbar, F.C., Measuring the societal impacts of automobile downsizing, Transportation Research A 14, 1980, pp. 423–434. 
Carrington, W.J., Detragiache, E., Vishwanath, T., Migration with endogenous moving costs, The American Economic Review 86(4), 1996, 
pp. 909-930. 
Chiswick, B.R., Are immigrants positively self-selected?, American Economic Review 89, 1999, pp. 181-185. 
Chiswick, B.R., Miller, P.W., Do enclaves matter in immigrant adjustment?, City & Community 4(1), 2005, pp. 5-35. 
Chiswick, B.R., Miller, P. W., The International Transferability of Human Capital Skills, IZA Discussion Paper 2670, IZA, Bonn, 2007. 
Christiadi, Cushing, B., The joint choice of an individual’s occupation and destination, Journal of Regional Science 48(5), 2008, pp. 893–
919. 
Cobb-Clark, D., Immigrant selectivity and wages: the evidence for women, American Economic Review 83, 1983, pp. 986-993. 
Constant, A., D'Agosto E., Where do the brainy Italians go?, IZA Discussion Paper 3325, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn, 2008. –  22  – 
  
Damm, A.P., Determinants of recent migrants' location choices: quasi-experimental evidence, Journal of Population Economics 22(1), 2009, 
pp. 145-174. 
Damm, A.P., Ethnic enclaves and immigrant labor market outcomes: quasi-experimental evidence, Journal of Labor Economics 27(2), 
2009a, pp. 281-314. 
Davies, P.S., Greenwood, M.J., Li, H., A conditional logit approach to U. S. state-to-state migration, Journal of Regional Science 41(2), 
2001, pp. 337–360. 
Dustmann, C., Glitz, A., Vogel, T., Employment, wages, and the economic cycle: Differences between immigrants and natives, European 
Economic Review 54, 2010, pp. 1-17. 
Dutari, J.C.T., The socio-cultural impact of brain-drain: reflections from Latin America, Higher Education Policy 7, 1994, pp. 25-28. 
Edin, P.-A., Fredriksson, P., Åslund, O., Ethnic Enclaves and the Economic Success of Immigrants—Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2729, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, 2001. 
Egger, P., Radulescu, D.M., The influence of labor taxes on the migration of skilled workers, CESifo Working Paper 2462, CESifo, Munich, 
2008. 
Epstein, G., Informational Cascades and Decision to Migrate, IZA Discussion Paper 445, Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn, 2002. 
Esping-Andersen, G., The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ), 1990. 
Fan, C.S., Stark, O., A social proximity explanation of the reluctance to assimilate, Kyklos 60, 2007, pp. 55-63. 
Geis, W., Uebelmesser, S., Werding, M., How do migrants choose their destination country? An analysis of institutional determinants, CESi-
fo Working Paper 2506, Munich, 2008. 
Gottlieb, P.D., Joseph, G., College-to-work migration of technology graduates and holders of doctorates within the United States, Journal of 
Regional Science 46(4), 2006, pp. 627–659. 
Green, T., Winters, L.A., Economic crises and migration: Learning from the past and the present, The World Economy 33, 2010, pp. 1053-
1073. 
Grogger, J., Hanson, G.H., Income maximization and the selection and sorting of international migrants, NBER Working Paper 13821, Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, 2008, Cambridge, MA. 
Gross, D.M., Schmitt, N., The role of cultural clustering in attracting new immigrants, Journal of Regional Science 43(2), 2003, pp. 295-318. 
Halton, J.H., On the efficiency of certain quasi-random sequences of points in evaluating multi-dimensional integrals, Numerische Mathema-
tik 2,1960, p. 84–90. 
Hausman, J., McFadden, D., Specification tests for the multinomial logit model, Econometrica 52, 1984, pp. 1219–1240.  
Heitmueller, A., Coordination failures in network migration, The Manchester School 74(6), 2006, 701-710. 
Hensher, D.A., The valuation of commuter travel time savings for car drivers: evaluating alternative model specifications, Transportation 28, 
2001, p. 101–118. 
Hensher, D.A., Greene, W.H., The mixed logit model: the state of practice," Transportation 30, 2003, pp. 133–176. 
Hole, A.R., Fitting mixed logit models by using maximum simulated likelihood, The Stata Journal 7, 2007, p. 388–401. 
Hunt, G.L., Mueller, R.E., North American migration: returns to skill, border effects, and mobility costs, The Review of Economics and Sta-
tistics 86, 2004, pp. 988-1007. 
Ibarran, P., Lubotsky, D., Mexican immigration and self-selection: new evidence from the 2000 Mexican census, NBER Working Paper 
11456, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005, Cambridge, MA. 
Jaeger, D.A., Green Cards and the location choices of immigrants in the United States, Research in Labor Economics 27, 2007, pp. 131–183. 
Körner, H., 'Brain Drain' aus Entwicklungsländern, IMIS-Beiträge 11, Osnabrück: Institut für Migrationsforschung und interkulturelle Stu-
dien der Universität Osnabrück, 1999, pp. 55-64. 
Krupka, D.J., Location-specific human capital, location choice and amenity demand, Journal of Regional Science 49(5), 2009, pp. 833-854. 
Lazear, E.P., Culture and language, Journal of Political Economy 107(6), 1999, pp. 95-126. 
Levine, P.B., Zimmerman, D.J., An empirical analysis of the welfare magnet debate using the NLSY, Journal of Population Economics 
12(3), 1999, pp. 391-409. 
Liebig, T., Sousa-Poza, A., Migration, self-selection and income inequality: an international analysis, Kyklos 57, 2004, pp. 125-146.  
Mahmood, T., Schömann, K., On the Migration Decision of IT-Graduates: A Two-Level Nested Logit Model, WZB Discussion Paper SP II 
2003-22, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (Social Science Research Center Berlin), Berlin, 2003. –  23  – 
  
Mahroum, S., Europe and the immigration of highly skilled labor, International Migration 39, 2001, pp. 27-43. 
Massy, D., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegriono, A., Taylor, J., Theories of international migration: a review and appraisal, Popu-
lation and Development Review 19(3), 1993, pp. 431-466. 
Mayer, T., Zigagno, S., Notes on CEPII's distances measures, Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales CEPII, Paris, 
2006. 
McFadden, D., Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior, in Frontiers in Econometrics, ed. by P. Zarembka. Academic 
Press, New York, 1974. 
McFadden, D., Train, K.E., Mixed MNL models for discrete response, Journal of Applied Econometrics 15, 2000, pp. 447–470. 
McKenzie, D., Rapoport, H., Self-selection patterns in Mexico-U.S. migration: the role of migration networks, World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 4118, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2007. 
Miranda, A., Migrant Networks, Migrant Selection, and High School Graduation in Mexico, IZA Discussion Paper 3204, Institute for the 
Study of Labor, Bonn, 2007. 
Molho, I., Theories of migration: a review, Scottish Journal of Political Economy 33(4), 1986, pp. 396-419. 
Munshi, K., Networks in the modern economy: Mexican migrants in the U.S. labor market, Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(2), 2003, 
pp. 549-599. 
Nakosteen, R.A., Westerlund, O., Zimmer, M., Migration and self-selection: measured earnings and latent characteristics, Journal of Region-
al Science 48, 2008, pp. 769-788. 
Nerdrum, L., Sarpebakken, B., Mobility of foreign researchers in Norway, Science and Public Policy 33, 2006, pp. 217-229. 
Niessen, J., Huddleston, T., Citron, L., Migrant Integration Policy Index, British Council and Migration Policy Group, Brussels, 2007. 
Nowotny, K., Ethnic Networks and the Location Choice of Migrants in Europe, Working Paper, mimeo, 2010. 
OECD, International Migration of the Highly Skilled, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, 2002. 
OECD, Pensions at a Glance 2007, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, 2007. 
OECD, PISA 2006. Volume 2: Data, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, 2007a.  
OECD, The Global Competition for Talent: Mobility of the Highly Skilled, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Par-
is, 2008. 
OECD, International Migration Outlook 2010, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, 2010. 
Pedersen, P.J., Pytlikova, M., Smith, N., Selection and network effects—Migration flows into OECD countries 1990-2000, European Eco-
nomic Review 52(7), 2008, pp. 1160-1186. 
Portnov, B.A., The effect of regional inequalities on migration: A comparative analysis of Israel and Japan, International Migration 37(3), 
1999, pp. 587-615. 
Roy, A., Some thoughts on the distribution of earnings, Oxford Economic Papers 3, 1951, pp. 135-146. 
Scruggs, L., The generosity of social insurance, 1971—2002, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 22(3), 2006, pp. 349-364. 
Stark, O., Patterns of Labor Migration when Workers Differ in Their Skills, in Giersch, H. (ed.), Economic Aspects of International Immi-
gration, Springer Verlag, Berlin, 1994. 
Taylor, E., Undocumented Mexico-U.S. migration and the returns to households in rural Mexico, American Journal of Agricultural Econom-
ics 69, 1987, pp. 626-638. 
Train, K.E., Halton sequences for mixed logit, Working paper, Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, 1999. 
Train, K.E., Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation, New York: Cambridge University Press, second ed., 2009. 
UNDP, Human Development Report 2009. Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development, United Nations Development Pro-
gramme, New York, 2009. 
Wall, H.J., Voting with your feet in the United Kingdom: Using cross migration rates to estimate relative living standards, Papers in Region-
al Science 80(1), 2001, pp. 1–23. 
Westerlund, O., Employment opportunities, wages and interregional migration in Sweden 1970-1989, Journal of Regional Science 37(1), 
1997, pp. 55-73.  
Yashiv, E., Self-selection of migrant workers: migration premium and (no) returns to skills, CEPR Discussion Paper 4156, Centre for Eco-
nomic Policy Research, London, 2003. 
Zavodny, M., Determinants of recent immigrants' locational choices, International Migration Review 33(4), 1999, pp. 1014-1030.   –  24  – 
  
 
Variable  Mean  S.D.  Min.  Max. 
         
Region size (in 1,000 km²)  17.345  23.686  0.161  165.296 
Population (in 100,000)  1.544  1.449  0.107  9.027 
Unemployment rate (in %)  7.290  3.743  2.286  20.186 
Avg. income p.a. (in € 1,000)  27.263  10.299  10.567  95.979 
Network  6.650  10.276  0.000  100.000 
Distance (in 1,000 km)  4.697  3.641  0.055  18.981 
Capital (=1)  0.082  0.275  0  1 
Common border (= 1)  0.045  0.207  0  1 
Common official language (= 1)  0.375  0.484  0  1 
Colony after 1945 (= 1)  0.140  0.347  0  1 
Avg. tax and SSC rate  31.577  7.909  20.541  46.943 
Net income ratio   95.156  2.503  91.230  100.000 
Unemployment replacement rate  60.462  14.875  36.000  87.000 
Pension replacement rate  77.869  18.632  41.100  110.100 
Sickness/healthcare expenditures  2.101  0.688  1.009  3.553 
PISA science scores  501.077  24.908  473.000  563.000 
MIPEX II Labour Market Access Index  66.154  21.031  40.000  100.000 
Table 1: Summary statistics for explanatory variables. Source: European Labour Force Survey, CEPII, OECD, 
Eurostat, British Council. 
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Variable  Mean(𝗽𝗽)   S.D.(𝗽𝗽)   %𝗽𝗽 > 0  𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀  (𝗽𝗽)  
           
Region size (in 1,000 km²)  0.000 ***       1.000 
  (0.000)        (0.000) 
Population (in 100,000)  0.245 ***  0.012 ***  100.000  1.278 
  (0.000)   (0.000)     (0.000) 
Unemployment rate (in %)  -0.060 ***  0.062 ***  16.407  0.941 
  (0.000)   (0.000)     (0.000) 
Avg. income p.a. (in € 1,000)  0.015 ***  0.009 ***  94.701  1.015 
  (0.000)   (0.000)     (0.000) 
Network  0.673 ***  0.044 ***  100.000  1.959 
  (0.001)   (0.000)     (0.002) 
Network²  -0.047 ***  0.036 ***  9.769  0.954 
  (0.000)   (0.000)     (0.000) 
Distance (in 1,000 km)  -0.435 ***  0.014 ***  0.000  0.647 
  (0.001)   (0.002)     (0.001) 
Distance (in 1,000 km)²  0.018 ***  0.003 ***  100.000  1.018 
  (0.000)   (0.000)     (0.000) 
Capital (=1)  -2.885 ***  4.358 ***  25.396  0.056 
  (0.009)   (0.011)     (0.001) 
Common border (=1)  0.503 ***  1.015 ***  68.980  1.653 
  (0.004)   (0.009)     (0.007) 
Common official language (=1)  1.828 ***  0.337 ***  100.000  6.223 
  (0.002)   (0.005)     (0.012) 
Colony after 1945 (=1)  -0.409 ***  0.716 ***  28.383  0.664 
  (0.003)   (0.008)     (0.002) 
Avg. tax and SSC rate  -0.070 ***  0.094 ***  22.767  0.932 
  (0.000)   (0.000)     (0.000) 
Net income ratio   0.170 ***  0.089 ***  97.174  1.185 
  (0.000)   (0.002)     (0.001) 
Unemployment replacement rate  -0.019 ***  0.000 ***  0.000  0.981 
  (0.000)   (0.000)     (0.000) 
Pension replacement rate  0.005 ***  0.001 ***  100.000  1.005 
  (0.000)   (0.000)     (0.000) 
Sickness/healthcare expenditures  -0.363 ***  0.008 ***  0.000  0.696 
  (0.002)   (0.002)     (0.002) 
PISA science scores  0.003 ***  0.000   100.000  1.003 
  (0.000)   (0.000)     (0.000) 
MIPEX II Labour Market Access 
 
0.025 ***  0.002 ***  100.000  1.025 
  (0.000)   (0.000)     (0.000) 
           
Observations  8,988,710         
Table 1: Random parameters logit regression of location choice. Germany and Ireland not included. Standard 
Error in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. RPL log likelihood simu-
lated using 500 Halton draws. Source: European Labour Force Survey 2007, Eurostat, CEPII, OECD, British 
Council, own calculations. 